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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA ANN FARLEY, 
Plamtiff-Respondent, 
v. 
ROSSE. FARLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Civil No. 
10567 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action, and the matter specifically 
before this Court on appeal is the modification of the orig-
inal divorce decree. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court, Judge Aldon J. Anderson presiding, 
granted a motion made by Respondent to modify the orig-
inal divorce decree. The modification granted a vested re-
mainder in the subject real property to Respondent. 
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NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant, Ross E. Farley, seeks to have the de-
cree of modification reversed and to have the action dis-
missed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The original decree. 
On October 3, 1958, Judge Aldon Anderson of the 
Third Judicial District, State of Utah, issued a divorce de-
cree which provided for alimony, custody of the children, 
visitation rights, and property settlement between the Plain-
tiff below, hereinafter called "Respondent" and Defendant 
below, hereinafter called "Appellant". As a part of the 
provision for the minor children of Respondent and Ap· 
pellant, the Court placed certain real property in trust to 
the Respondent as Trustee for the children (R. 67). The , 
i terms of the Trust were that the Respondent would hold 
said real property in trust for the children to cover their 
support and education during their minority. The Decree 
further provided : 
"And she [Respondent] shall convey the corpus 
of the trust estate and all accumulations and addi· 
tions thereto in equal shares to said minor children, 
or to the survivor of them, when the youngest at· 
tains or would have attained the age of 18 years. 
* * *" (R. 68). 
The property to be distributed according to the terms 
of such decree and trust, was ultimately determined to be 
that property, located in Sacramento County, California, 
described as follows : 
I 
~ 
"North half of Lots 1 and 3, Block 16, of Fair 
Oaks tract, according to the official ~lat thereof 
filed in the Office of the Recorder of Sacramento 
County, California" (R. 73). 
It should be noted by the terms of the decree said real 
property was not included in the property settlement as 
between Respondent and Appellant; rather, the property 
was disposed of for the benefit of the minor children. 
The California litigation. 
Subsequent to the issuance of the Decree of October 
3, 1958, both of the parties involved moved to the State of 
California. On June 18, 1959, the Respondent filed an ac-
tion in the Superior Court of the State of California in and 
for the County of Sacramento to enforce the provisions of 
the Utah divorce decree, (see page 1 of Exhibit D-5), and 
to quiet her title to the property here involved. As part of 
the relief demanded in such Complaint, Respondent prayed 
as follows: 
"For an order and decree declaring and adjudg-
ing that Plaintiff, as trustee for Ross Edward Far-
ley, II and Barbara Susanne Farley, is the owner 
of said real property described in said order modi-
fying decree dated December 17, 1958, and described 
in paragraph V of plaintiff's first stated Cause of 
Action and that Defendants, or any of them, have 
no right, title, estate or interest whatever in or to 
said real property, and that Defendants, and all of 
them, be forever debarred from asserting any claim 
whatsoever in or to said real property adverse to 
the Plaintiff" (Page 7 of Ex. D-5) . 
4 
On August 11, 1959, Appellant filed an action in the 
same California Court to quiet title to the same real prop. 
erty which is here in dispute (See Page 87 of Ex. D-5). 
The two actions thus filed were consolidated for trial in 
November of 1959 (See page 37 of Ex. D-5). 
The California trial court confirmed the divorce de-
cree with the exception of paragraphs 7 and 8, which pro-
vided for the trust as described above and quieted Appel-
lant's title in the real property subject to a lien upon said 
real property for alimony and child support (See Ex. G). 
This decree was in turn appealed to the District Court of 1. 
Appeal in and for the Third Appellate District for the 
State of California. The opinion of the California appellate 
court is included as Ex. B in the Record and might be sum- ! 
marized as follows: 
(a) The conveyance of the real property in trust, 
during the minority of the children, was properly within 
the Utah Court's jurisdiction and could not be collaterally 
attacked in the Courts of California. 
(b) The further provision in the Utah decree which 
provided that upon the children's reaching their majority, 
the property would be distributed to them, was beyond the ' 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court and was thus subject to 
collateral attack in the State of California. In this regard, 
the Court noted : 
"We conclude that the award [Judge Ander· 
son's October, 1958 Decree] exceeds the jurisdiction 
of the Utah Court to the extent that it decrees trans· 
fer of property or money to the children when they 
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reach adulthood. The lack of jurisdiction appears 
on the face of the Utah decree." 
The final portion of the California decision concluded: 
"We conclude that the Utah decree, so far as it 
directed conveyance of the land, its proceeds or in-
come, to the Defendant's children upon their reach-
ing adulthood, exceeded the jurisdiction of the Utah 
court, that it is vulnerable to collateral attack in 
Utah and not entitled to full faith and credit in Cal-
ifornia" (See pp. 6 and 10 of Ex. D-4). 
In accordance with the appellate court's decision, the 
California trial court, upon remand of the case, issued a 
modified decree and judgment which provided in essence 
that the Appellant must forthwith convey the real property 
in trust to the Respondent for the benefit of the minor 
children during their minority. Appellant executed such a 
deed on May 28, 1965 (Ex. D-11). The decree also provided 
that after the children had reached their majority (in De-
cember of 1967), the trust should terminate and the Re-
spondent should reconvey the property, or its remaining 
proceeds to the Appellant as his sole and separate property 
(See Ex. D-12). 
The net effect of the California litigation, therefore, 
was simply to grant a vested remainder in the trust prop-
erty to the Appellant, after the children had reached their 
majority. 
The Utah litigation. 
Once it appeared that the California litigation would 
work to the ultimate benefit of the Appellant, Respondent 
b 
brought the case back before the Utah Court. This switch 
of forums was initiated by a motion under date of March 
11, 1965, which requested the Utah district court to modify 1 
its original divorce decree (R. 164). One request made in 
this Motion was for the Court to modify its Decree and 
provide that the real property in dispute be awarded to Re-
spondent as her separate property. 
A hearing on the above Motion was ultimately held on 
the 5th day of January 1966. There was no evidence pre-
sented to the Court other than that contained in the exhibits 
on appeal pertaining to the California litigation. There 
was no testimony or evidence as to the circumstances of 
the parties, their present marital status, their present in-
comes or their present property holdings. 
The Trial Court modified the decree in accordance 
with Respondent's Motion, and ruled that the property 
should be conveyed in trust for the benefit of the minor 
children until their majority at which time the property 
would be held free and clear by the Respondent (R. 204). 
The net effect of this modification was to take the vested 
remainder from the Appellant, as it had been granted to 
him in the California litigation, and to grant the same to 
the Respondent. She thus obtained in the order appealed 
from a complete reversal of the California decree. It is 
from this Order of the Trial Court, dated January 27, 1966, 
that Appellant appeals to this Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
THE REAL PROPERTY HERE IN DISPUTE 
TO THE RESPONDENT, SINCE THE MATTER 
HAS BEEN FINALLY AND COMPLETELY 
ADJUDICATED PRIOR TO SAID AWARD 
AND IS RES JUDICATA. 
The first contention on this appeal concerns the effect 
of the California litigation upon the power of the Utah trial 
court to make the disposition here in question. For pur-
poses of clarification, the pertinent decrees of the Utah and 
California courts might be summarized as follows: 
( 1) Original Utah Divorce Decree of 1958: 
Property to wife as trustee for children during their 
minority, remairnder to children. 
(2) California Decree (as modified on appeal) of 
1965: 
Property to wife as trustee for children during their 
minority, remainder to husband. 
(3) Utah Decree on motion to modify granted in 
1966: 
Property to wife as trustee for children during their 
minority, remainder to wife. 
It is the last of these decrees which is here in question. 
The position of the Appellant is simply that the property 
was dealt with and disposed of in the California litigation; 
that such a disposition is res judicata in California; and 
that the Utah trial court was precluded from rendering the 
third decree above mentioned, by virtue of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. This 
argument is augmented in the following subpoints : 
(a) The parties to this action have litigated 
their respective rights to the subiect property in 
the California courts. 
After the rendition of the 1958 Utah Decree, both par-
ties moved to California, Respondent there filed suit asking, 
inter alia, for the following relief: 
( 1) For an order establishing the Utah De-
cree in California "with the same force and effect 
as if said Decree * * * had been granted by 
this Court" (Ex. D-5, p. 6). 
(2) For an order quieting title in the property 
to Respondent as trustee for the children (Ex. D-5, 
p. 7). 
(3) For an order appointing a receiver to take 
possession of the subject property and ordering a 
sale of such property. (Ibid.) 
Appellant likewise filed a complaint in California to quiet 
his title to the subject property (Ex. D-5, p. 87). The two 
actions were ultimately joined for trial on the merits. 
The question thus raised is just what was litigated in 
the California actions. It seems clear that the California 
litigation was far more extensive than would be a sterile 
judicial proceeding for the establishment of a divorce de-
cree. This litigation was sufficiently involved with the 
parties' marital rights and problems to raise traditional 
concepts of res judicata in the subsequent Utah litigation. 
Mere common sense will compel the conclusion that 
when a divorced husband and wife bring cross quiet title 
actions against each other concerning specific property, 
they are in a very real sense litigating their marital rights 
to such property. Moreover, the record itself demonstrates 
that the parties, in California, raised additional marital 
matters such as modification of alimony (Ex. D-5, p. 84); 
modification of support (ibid.); and modification of visi-
tation rights (ibid.). 
In effect, the parties merely moved to California and 
appealed to the courts of that State to resolve numerous 
issues relative to their divorce. Of course, the State of Cal-
ifornia had a legitimate interest in such matters since both 
parties resided in California and the situs of the property 
is there as well. Since the parties did litigate their various 
marital rights in California, it is presumed that they liti-
gated their marital property rights as well. As stated in 
Smith v. Smith, 77 Utah 60, 68, 291 Pac. 298 (1930): 
"The settlement of property rights between the 
parties is an incident to every decree of divorce 
where there is any property involved." 
Where the parties litigate custody, support, alimony 
and visitation rights-as well as their respective rights to 
the title of the property itself-they have clearly litigated 
their marital rights to the property. Nor can it be claimed 
that the California litigation was confined to the mechani-
cal task of establishing, as a matter of law, the Utah divorce 
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decree. Rather, the transcript (Ex. P-9) clearly shows tha! 
the parties delved into every facet of their circumstances: 
income, bills, expenses, employment, ad infinitum. 
Further evidence of the extent of the California litiga. 
tion appears in the text of the opinion by the California 
Appellate Court (Ex. B). It demonstrates, too that Respon-
dent requested affirmative relief concerning the property 
in California : 
"Plaintiff [Respondent] urges, nevertheless, 
that she is entitled to a similar disposition at the 
hands of the California courts as a matter of com· 
ity" (Ex. B, p. 10). 
The foregoing facts, together with this Court's clear 
statement in Smith v. Smith, clearly demonstrates that, as 
a matter of law, the parties did litigate their respective 
marital property rights in the California litigation. 
(b) The determination of property rights by the 
California Court is final and res judicata and 
must be given Full Fa#h and Credit in the Courts 
of this State. 
Once it is established that the parties did litigate their 
marital property rights in the State of California, the fur· 
ther question becomes to what extent such litigation limits 
the Utah trial court in making different provisions with 
regard to the marital property rights of the parties. At 
first blush, it might appear that the California litigation 
would have no inhibiting effect upon the Utah trial court, 
since in Utah, at least, property setttlements ostensibly can 
be modified under Utah Code Ann., §30-3-5 (1953). If the 
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same legal situation existed in California, it would appear 
that the Utah trial court was within its discretion in modi-
fying the California decree. 
However, in determining the effect of the California 
decree, the law of California and not that of Utah should 
be applied. Unlike Utah, California does not allow the 
modification of a divorce decree respecting marital prop-
erty rights. Thus, for example, in the leading case of 
Hough V. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605, 160 P. 2d 15 (1945), 
after noting that alimony and support decrees could be 
modified, the Court said : 
"This does not mean that payment under prop-
erty settlement agreements may be modified even 
though incorporated in the decree. They may not 
. . . but in such a situation, there is not the same 
underlying policy. The settlement of property r~ghts 
should be final in order to secure stability of titles." 
Similarly, in the case of Broome v. Broome, 231 P. 2d 171 
(Cal., 1951), the Court noted: 
"A divorce decree which establishes the prop-
erty rights of the parties is not subject to modifica-
tion without the consent of both parties ... When 
an interlocutory judgment for divorce valid and 
regularly entered, is not vacated, it becomes a final 
judicial determination of the property rights of the 
parties ... " 
It follows that the California decree which granted a 
vested remainder to the husband upon the children's reach-
ing their majority, is a final judgment which cannot be 
modified without the consent of both parties. 
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Under settled principles of res judicata, as applied here 
through the Full Faith and Credit clause of the United 
States Constitution, such decree issued by the California 
courts must be given the same effect here in the State of 
Utah. 28 U.S. C. Section 1738 (1950), 62 Stat. 947 (1948). 
As noted by Mr. Justice Dougles, in State ex rel. Halvey v. 
Halvey, 3'30 U. S. 610, 91 L. Ed. 1133 ,(1946): 
"The general rule is that this command re· 
quires the judgment of a sister state to be given 
full, not partial, credit in the state of the forum." 
The result is apparent. Since the property decree is final 
and not subject to modification in California where it was 
rendered, the State of Utah and its courts must give Full 
Faith and Credit to such decree. 
The ostensible authority of Utah courts to modify their 
own property decrees is of course irrelevant to the question 
at hand. It has been definitively established that, in de· 
termining what effect should be given a foreign decree, the 
applicable law is that of the state which rendered the de-
cree and not that of the forum state. Yarborough v. Yar-
borough, 290 U. S. 202, 78 L. Ed. 269 (1933). 
The finality of the California decree is not merely a 
matter of California law. It is founded as well in sound 
policy which has been previously adopted by this Court. In 
the case of Smith v. Smith, 77 Utah 60, 291 Pac. 298 
(1930), this Court was faced with a question which was 
factually and legally identical to that involved in the in· 
stant case. In the Smith case, the parties had obtained a 
divorce in the State of North Dakota. Subsequently, an 
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action was brought in Utah for an accounting with regard 
to certain marital property rights. The defense was raised 
that the matter had been finally adjudicated in North Da-
kota and was res judicata. This Court, after citing num-
erous authorities concerning the finality of divorce decrees, 
stated as follows : 
"What we hold is that under the evidence in 
this case it is clear that the matters in issue between 
the parties hereto were involved and might have 
been raised and settled in the divorce case in North 
Dakota." (Emphasis added.) 
The Court concluded, therefore, that the matter was res 
judicata and could not be relitigated. The instant case is 
much stronger, for here, the issue not only "might have 
been raised and settled" by the parties in the California 
litigation, but indeed they actually litigated the issue. It 
follows that the California decree should be given res judi-
cata effect and should not have been modified by the trial 
court below. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
THE REAL PROPERTY HERE IN DISPUTE 
TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial Court did not 
violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause in decreeing that 
the real property should go to the children in trust, with 
the remainder to Respondent upon their reaching majority, 
it remains true that such disposition by the trial court was 
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in violation of settled principles of Utah substantive law. 
The following subpoints elaborate this contention: 
(a) Utah law precludes the modification of 
a divorce decree, respecting property rights, where 
such modification purports to dispose of proper-
ties not i..'ncluded in the property settlement of the 
original decree. 
In the original divorce decree, signed by Judge Ander-
son in 1958 (R. 65-68), the subject property was awarded 
to the wife as trustee for the minor children, with the fol-
lowing provisions : 
"And she shall convey the corpus of the trust 
estate and all accumulations and additions thereto 
in equal shares to said minor children, or to the 
survivor of them, when the youngest attains or 
would have attained the age of 18 years * * *" 
(R. 68). 
It is clear, therefore, that the property was not 
awarded to either the husband or wife as a settlement of 
marital property rights. It was awarded to the children 
as a part of the child support provisions of the decree. 
After the advent of the California litigation, which 
voided that portion of the foregoing decree which gave the 
remainder to the children, Respondent returned to Utah 
and filed her Motion to modify the original Utah decree (R. 
164). The relief sought through modification is spelled out 
in paragraph 8 of said Motion (R. 68) as follows: 
"In the alternative the Plaintiff requests the 
Utah court to modify its decree entered herein to 
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provide that said real property be awarded to the 
Plaintiff as her separate property." 
The trial court modified the decree in accordance with that 
prayer (R. 195 et seq.). 
What the Utah trial court did was to include real prop-
erty within the property settlement between the parties, 
which property was not originally included in the property 
provision of the 1958 divorce decree. The question pre-
sented, therefore, is whether the Court may "modify" the 
original property settlement of the parties, as incorporated 
in the 1958 decree, by adding thereto an additional prop-
erty disposition in favor of Respondent. It is respectfully 
submitted that the power to modify granted by Utah Code 
Ann. 30-3 .... 5 (1953) is not so pervasive. A similar problem 
was raised in the case of Glover v. Glover, 121 Utah 362, 
242 P. 2d 298 (1952), where as here, the wife sought to 
modify the original divorce decree by claiming real prop-
erty which had not been included in the original decree. 
The court held, in a three-to-two decision, that upon a 
showing of extrinsic fraud, such a modification would be 
justified. (The two dissenting judges seemed to argue that 
the matter should be laid to rest once and for all, notwith-
standing the fraud.) Even the majority holding in the 
Glover decision, however, would not sanction the modifica-
tion here made by the trial court, since there was no alle-
gation or proof with regard to the extrinsic fraud in the 
trial court below. The conclusion thus compelled by the 
Glover decision is that since there was no allegation of 
fraud, and since the real property here in dispute was not 
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included in the property settlement of the original decree, 
but in the support provisions of such decree, the decree can-
not now be modified to include said property within tM 
property settlement. 
An analogous limitation upon the trial court's right to 
modify a divorce decree is found in the alimony cases, 
wherein it has been repeatedly held that where no alimony 
is allowed in the original decree, such decree cannot subse-
quently be modified to include alimony. Hamilton v. Ham-
ilton, 89 Utah 5'54, 58 P. 2d 11 (1936); Cody V. Cody, 47 
Utah 456, 154 Pac. 9152 (1916). From such decisions has 
grown the traditional Utah practice of including alimony 
of $1.00 per year to allow subsequent modification of the 
alimony provisions upon the showing of changed circum-
stances. 
The result seems apparent that, where the real prop· 
erty was not included in the original property settlement, 
it may not years later be included by a purported "modifi· 
cation" of the original decree. 
(b) The Supreme Court of Utah has inter-
preted Utah Code Ann., Section 30-3-5, as allow-
ing the modification of a property settlement in 
only the most extreme and unusual circumstances 
which circumstances do not exist in this case. 
An examination of the decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Utah clearly indicates that 'Section 30-3-5 does not, in 
the normal case, provide for the modification of a property 
settlement. With regard to modification, that Section pro· 
vides as follows : 
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"Such subsequent changes or new orders may 
be made by the Court with respect to the disposal 
of the children or the distribution of the property 
as shall be reasonable and proper." 
The concluding words of the quote suggest that both the trial 
courts and the Supreme Court are vested with considerable 
discretion in the modification of divorce decrees. However, 
the Supreme Court decisions have clearly indicated that the 
modification of property settlement "is reasonable and 
proper" in only the most extreme and unusual cases. This 
policy is supported by the desirability of stabilizing prop-
erty titles, and by the general policy of res judicata. 
It is true that in some Utah cases there is rather broad 
dictum to the effect that a court has vast powers of modi-
fication. Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1010 
(1898); Wallis v. Wallis, 9 Utah 2d 237, 342 P. 2d 103 
(1959). Neither of these cases, however, deals with the 
modification of a property settlement and any discussion 
in such cases with regard to modification of property set-
tlements is purely dictum. 
Other cases, in which modifications of property settle-
ments have actually been before the Court, are much more 
useful in analyzing the propriety of the modification in the 
instant case. Thus, for example in the case of Callister V. 
Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P. 2d 944 (1953), this Court 
was faced with an identical problem to that here: Whether 
or not a property settlement, incorporated in a divorce de-
cree can be subsequently modified. In that case, an action 
was brought by the husband to revoke payments and ali-
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mony he had been paying in pursuance of the decree. The 
wife claimed that such payments were not subject to modi-
fication inasmuch as they constituted part of the property 
settlement rather than alimony. In a discussion of this 
defense, the Supreme Court cited with apparent approval 
the California decision of Hough V. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605, 
160 P. 2d 15. Quoting from that case, the Callister opinion 
notes: 
"This does not mean that payments under prop-
erty settlement agreements may be modified even 
though incorporated in the decree. They may not. 
(Citing authorities.) But in such a situation there 
is not the same underlying policy. The settlement 
of property rights should be final in order to secure 
stability of titles." 
Upon further analysis, the Utah Supreme Court determined 
that the payments sought to be modified were alimony and 
not property setttlement payments and thus, could be prop-
erly modified. The clear implication of this decision is that 
property settlements themselves may not be modified on a 
mere showing of changed circumstances. If property set-
tlements can be so readily modified under the authority of 
Section 30-3-5, the Supreme Court in the Callister case 
would not have gone to the difficulty of discussing the 
question of whether it was an alimony or property decree 
under consideration. The distinction between alimony or 
property would be entirely superfluous unless it is true 
that property settlements are not so easily modified as 
alimony clauses. 
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The same philosophy is articulated in Parish v. Mc-
Conkie, 84 Utah 396, 35 P. 2d 1001 ( 1934). In that case, 
on the question of modification of property rights in a di-
vorce decree, this Court notes : 
"At the conclusion of the hearing, the court 
made and entered its order modifying the decree 
of April 12, 1932, by reducing the alimony and re-
fusing 'to entertain jurisdiction of the plaintiff's 
petition to modify said decree so far as said petition 
sought to modify the decree heretofore entered set-
tling the property rights.' It is not found or indi-
cated, nor is it disclosed by the record of the trial 
court what reason the court had in mind for so re-
fusing to entertain jurisdiction. No reason being 
assigned, it may be assumed that the trial court 
took the view that such iudgment was a final iudg-
ment, and therefore not subiect to the rules relating 
to interlocutory or alimony iudgments or iudgments 
relating to custody of children, and was therefore 
a final iudgment." (Emphasis added.) 
Further on in the opinion, the Supreme Court confirms 
such an assumption on the part of the trial court when it 
states: 
"Further, the judgment dividing the property 
is based upon a contract, and no question of fraud, 
good faith, undue influence, or overreaching is pre-
sented. The iudgment settling property rights is 
final and a bar to any actfon afterwards brought by 
either party to determine the question of property 
rights" (84 Utah at 400). (Emphasis added.) 
Clearly, such a holding would preclude modification of the 
property settlement here, even if Respondent had shown 
some material evidence of changed circumstances. 
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Also instructive is the case of Glover v. Glover, 121 
Utah 362, 242 P. 2d 298 ( 1952). In this case, the Court 
held that a showing of fraud was necessary to include real 
property in modifying a divorce decree which did not in. 
elude such property originally. 
Finally, the case of Smith, v. Smith, 77 Utah 60, 291 
Pac. 298 (1930) is of interest. In that case the Court held 
that the North Dakota property settlement of the marital 
property rights of the parties, was res judicata and pre· 
eluded subsequent action in the State of Utah. The fore· 
going cases are not iconoclastic or in violation of Section 
30-3 ... 5. Such cases merely reflect the judicial policy that 
a property settlement may not be modified unless unusual 
grounds, such as fraud, mistake, or undue influence are 
shown. Only in such cases will the modification be "reas· 
ona;ble and proper" within the contemplation of 30-3-5. 
Such a policy of nonmodification is followed in virtually 
all states, and is stated to be the general rule : 
"If, in settlement of property rights, a decree 
provides .for a lump sum, or payments in install· 
men ts, or a transfer of property, it is generally held 
that the award is final and is not subject to modi· 
fication as the circumstances of the parties change" 
24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, §941. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
FOLLOW CALIFORNIA LAW IN DETERMIN-
ING THE DI'SPOSITION OF THE REAL PROP-
ERTY HERE IN DISPUTE, SINCE THE SITUS 
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OF ,SAID PROPERTY IS IN CALIFORNIA, 
AND CALIFORNIA LAW MUST BE APPLIED. 
Even assuming that the trial court had the jurisdic-
tion to modify the decree and was not precluded from so 
doing by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, nonetheless, it 
is submitted that the modification was in error. The trial 
court was faced with one basic question: Should the prop-
erty settlement in the original decree be modified so as to 
grant the real property to the wife, upon termination of 
the minority of the children? In resolving this question, the 
Court assumed that it had jurisdiction and power to effect 
such a modification under Section 130-3-'5. It is submitted, 
however, that since the real property, which was the sub-
ject of the modification, is located in the State of Cali-
fornia, that the law of that state, rather than Utah law, 
should have been applied in determining whether or not a 
modification should have been allowed. 
The issue does not concern merely the personal rights 
of the parties. Rather, it affects basic property concepts 
affecting real property located in the State of California. 
Moreover, both parties to this litigation are residents of 
California, their children are residents of that state, vari-
ous witnesses and other persons who possess any interest 
or knowledge in this case are located in California, and the 
parties have subjected their rights to the Courts of the 
State of California. It is apparent, therefore, that Cali-
fornia has numerous contacts and interests in this litiga-
tion, but the State of Utah has practically no interest what-
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soever, aside from the fortituous fact that the original di-
vorce decree was issued here. 
The applicable choice of law doctrine is stated sue. 
cinctly in the following quote from 16 Am. Jur. 2d 23, Con. 
flict of Laws, Section 14: 
"It is a universal principle that real or immov-
able property is exclusively subject to the laws of 
the country or state within which it is situated, and 
no interference with it by any other sovereignty 
can be permitted. Therefore, all matters concerning 
the title and disposition of real property are de-
termined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, 
which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title 
to it can pass from one person to another, or an in-
terest therein of any sort can be gained and lost. 
This general principle includes all rules which gov-
ern the descent, alienation, and transfer of such 
property and the validity, effect, and construction 
of wills and other conveyances." 
This basic choice of law doctrine was early adopted in 
Utah in the case of Conant Deep Creek v. Curlew Valley 
Irrigation Company, 23 Utah 627, 66 Pac. 188 ( 1901). It 
is also adopted in the American Law Institute, Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws, §214 et seq. This doctrine applies 
with equal force to conveyances by operation of law and 
transfers involving marital property. American Law In· 
stitute, Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § §223 and 237. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court in de· 
termining whether its original decree should have been 
modified, should have looked to the law of California. Had 
the Court done so, it is clear that the result would have been 
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that no modification would be allowed. In California, a 
property settlement is final and may not, under any cir-
cumstances, save fraud or consent of the parties, be modi-
fied. Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605, 160 P. 2d 15 (1945); 
Broome v. Broome, 321P.2d 171(Cal.,1951). Indeed, as 
noted in the Hough case, California has a legitimate inter-
est in securing "stability of title" to its real property. Such 
interest will clearly be subverted if the law of Utah as in-
terpreted by the Courts below, in the form of Section 30-
3-5, is to prevail with regard to the disposition of California 
real property. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING 
THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE DECREE WITH-
OUT EVIDENCE OF CHANGED CIRCUM-
STANCES. 
Even if it be conceded that the trial court had the 
power to modify the decree and was not precluded from so 
doing by any of the foregoing defenses, it remains true 
that such modification could only be made upon an allega-
tion and showing of changed circumstances. The Utah law 
on this point is profuse. Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 261, 
225 Pac. 76 (1924); Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47 P. 2d 
894 (1935); Scott v. Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 P. 2d 198 
(1943). 
The only implication of changed circumstances raised in 
Respondent's Motion to Modify was the discussion of the 
California litigation (Tr. 164 and 165). And the effect of 
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the California litigation was alleged by Respondent to be 
a sufficient change in circumstances to justify the modifi. 
cation (R. 192). Indeed, the trial court itself stated: 
"Since the California Courts, within their 
power so to act, have determined that there is an 
invalidity concerning the disposition of the Cali-
fornia property, it is the opinion of the Court that 
the Court now has power to amend the prior divorce 
decree ... " (Tr. 20). 
Other than the effect of the California litigation, there was 
no evidence presented whatsoever with regard to changed 
circumstances. In fact, neither of the parties personally 
appeared in Utah for the hearing of the motion. 
The question thus presented is whether the California 
decision is, itself, a sufficient change in circumstances to 
justify the modification of the decree. An analysis of the 
effect of the California decree clearly illustrates that it 
presents no material change whatsoever. The original Utah 
decree gave the remainder to the children-the wife was 
given no interest in the property except as trustee for the 
children. As far as the wife was concerned, therefore, the 
California decree did not change her position since it 
merely granted the remainder to the husband. The wife's 
interest remained the same as under the Utah decree. 
At best, the California decree has increased the hus-
band's property holding by granting him a remainder to 
the subject property. This, however, is a future interest 
not to vest until December of 1967. It hardly creates any 
present change in the circumstances of the parties which 
would justify the modification. 
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Such a minimal change hardly meets the criterion laid 
down by the court in Gale v. Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 P. 2d 
986 (1953) : 
"The legal principle controlling in this case is 
that a divorce decree may not be modified unless it 
is alleged, proved and the trial court finds that the 
circumstances upon which it was based have under-
gone a substanti'al change." (Emphasis added.) 
The only change shown in the case is an in futuro increase 
in Appellant's property holdings. There has been no evi-
dence of increased need on the part of the wife, the present 
income of the parties, their marital status, their obligations, 
their expenses, or any of the other myriad facts which are 
relevant to a modification proceeding. Clearly, such facts 
are indispensable to a fair decision on modification. 
No Utah decision can be found which supports a modi-
fication where the only showing of changed circumstances 
consists of a future change in the husband's property hold-
ings. To the contrary, the decisions reflect a policy requir-
ing thorough analysis of both parties' circumstances before 
any modification is allowed. See, e.g., Carson v. Carson, 
87 Utah 1, 47 P. 2d 894 (1935). Moreover, this Court has 
clearly stated that the required scope of inquiry in deter-
mining a property award must be bilateral-that is it must 
encompass the abilities and needs of both parties. Foreman 
V. Foreman, 111Utah72, 176 P. 2d 144 (1946). It is re-
spectfully urged that the evidence before the trial court fell 
wholly short of establishing any "substantial" change in the 
parties' circumstances and thus the decree must be re-
versed. 
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POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO DISMISS THIS CASE ON THE GROUND 
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS. 
As has been noted, both parties to this case now reside 
in California. Both have voluntarily litigated their respec-
tive claims in the California Courts. The children of the 
parties reside in California. The real property here at issue 
is located in the State of California. Witnesses who would 
testify with regard to the value of the subject property, the 
circumstances of the parties, and other relevant facts are 
all located in California. And, California has a legitimate 
and real interest in this proceeding since it is primarily re· 
sponsible for the welfare and well being of its residents. 
Utah, on the other hand, has no contacts whatsoever 
with the case except for the remote, and rather fortituous 
fact that in 1958 the parties resided in Utah and obtained 
their original divorce decree here. 
It was, therefore, urged at the trial court level (R. 
223) and is urged again now that the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens should be applied and this case dismissed. That 
doctrine is designed specfically for such a situation. As 
noted in State ex rel. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. District 
Court, 139 Mont. 453, 365 P. 2d 512 (1961) : 
"The purpose of the rule is to require litigants 
to avail themselves of the trial forum of their resi· 
dence and not burden the taxpayers and courts of 
foreign jurisdictions with such causes." 
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Certainly the State of Utah and its judiciary should not be 
troubled with a cause which has no contacts whatsoever 
with the forum, particularly where, as here, the parties 
have a convenient and readily available forum in their home 
state. 
Another rationale for the doctrine is the prevention of 
forum shopping by plaintiffs. Vargas v. A. H. Bull Steam-
ship Co., 44 N. J. Super. 536, 131 A. 2d 39 (1957). In the 
instant case, Respondent returned to Utah only after the 
California litigation had gone sour for her. This is forum 
shopping in its most objectionable form and should not be 
sanctioned by this Court. 
The most obvious reason for applying the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens is, as the name implies, that it is in-
convenient for the parties to litigate an action in a juris-
diction which has no contacts with the matter. This is cer-
tainly true in the instant case, where the evidence required 
for a full and fair hearing on the question of modification 
would have to be transported to Utah at great cost and in-
convenience to the parties. Forum non conveniens was in-
vented to prevent this type of harrassment, and for this 
reason, the case should have been dismissed by the trial 
court. Star v. Berry, 25 N. J. 573, 138 A. 2d 44 (1958). 
If the instant case does not present a proper setting 
for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens, it is 
difficult to conceive of a case which would be dismissed 
under that rule. Certainly no case could have fewer con-
tacts with the forum than does this. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted on the basis of the forego. 
ing points, summarized below, that the modifying decree 
of the trial Court below be reversed and that this action be 
dismissed from the Courts of this State, because: 
(1) The Courts of the State of California have fully 
litigated the marital property rights of these parties to the 
subject real property. Such litigation and the resultant 
California decree are res judicata in the State of California 
and must be given like effect in the Courts of this State 
under both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Utah 
case of Smith v. Smith, 77 Utah 60, 291 Pac. 298 (1930). 
(2) Even assuming, arguendo, that the lower Court 
could constitutionally act as it did, it erred in modifying 
the property settlement of the original divorce decree be· 
cause the property thus included in the property settlement 
was not included in the original property settlement in the 
1958 decree. Moreover, the decisions of this Court have 
allowed modification of property settlements in only the 
most extreme and unusual circumstances, which circum-
stances have not been shown to exist in this case. 
(3) In determining whether to modify the property 
settlement, the trial Court should have followed the law of 
the State of California since the situs of the subject real 
property is located in that State. The trial Court's failure 
to apply California law was critical since California law 
does not permit such modification as was granted by the 
trial Court. 
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( 4) The trial Court erred in modifying the original 
decree without the benefit of either allegations or proof 
with respect to a substantial change in circumstances of the 
parties. 
( 5) The trial Court erred in refusing to dismiss this 
case on the grounds of forum non conveniens. This action 
has no contacts with the State of Utah, and the parties have 
a readily available forum in their home state to which they 
have previously subjected this litigation. 
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